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Abstract 
Standard neoclassical economics asks what agents’ actions, strategies, or expectations 
are in equilibrium with (consistent with) the outcome or pattern these behaviors 
aggregatively create. Agent-based computational economics enables us to ask a wider 
question: how agents’ actions, strategies, or expectations might react to—might 
endogenously change with—the patterns they create. In other words, it enables us to 
examine how the economy behaves out of equilibrium, when it is not at a steady state. 
 
This out-of-equilibrium approach is not a minor adjunct to standard economic theory; it 
is economics done in a more general way. When examined out of equilibrium, 
economic patterns sometimes simplify into a simple, homogeneous equilibrium of 
standard economics; but just as often they show perpetually novel and complex 
behavior. The static equilibrium approach suffers two characteristic indeterminacies: it 
cannot easily resolve among multiple equilibria; nor can it easily model individuals’ 
choices of expectations. Both problems are ones of formation (of an equilibrium and of 
an “ecology” of expectations, respectively), and when analyzed in formation—that is, 
out of equilibrium—these anomalies disappear. 
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complexity 
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Out-of-Equilibrium Economics and Agent-Based Modeling 
W. Brian Arthur 
1 Introduction 
Over the last twenty years a different way of doing economics has been slowly 
emerging. It goes by several labels: complexity economics, computational modeling, 
agent-based modeling, adaptive economics, research on artificial economies, generative 
social science—each of these with its own peculiarities, its own followers, and its own 
nuances. Whatever the label, what is happening, I believe, is more than just the 
accumulation of computer-based or agent-based studies. It is a movement in 
economics.1 
 
Why this movement? One answer all its practitioners agree on is that agent-based 
modeling came along in the 1980s because at that time economists got desktop 
workstations. For the first time we could not just study equilibria but ask how they 
form. Agent-based modeling is about how patterns in the economy form (I like Joshua 
Epstein’s term generative explanation for this), and usually such formation is too 
complicated to be handled analytically—hence the resort to computer simulation. This 
is fine. But does it mean agent-based computational economics is merely an adjunct to 
conventional economics that adds something about pattern formation? And if it relies 
mainly on simulating economic processes on the computer, isn’t this a retreat from 
theory? What does this way of doing economics really provide? 
 
In this overview essay I want to argue that this movement is not a minor adjunct to 
neoclassical economics; it is something more than this. It is a shift from looking at 
economic problems at equilibrium to looking at such problems out of equilibrium, a 
shift to a more general economics—an out-of-equilibrium economics. 
 
Before I begin, a caveat to the reader. This essay is a line of reasoning about the nature 
of agent-based economics; it makes no attempt to review the agent-based computation 
literature, nor does it give instructions on how to carry out agent-based computation. 
Both topics have been well covered elsewhere. 
 
I will start not by discussing agent-based modeling, but the economy itself. 
                                                 
1
 The progression of the subject can be seen by comparing the volumes: Anderson, Arrow and Pines 
(1988); Arthur, Durlauf and Lane (1997); Blume and Durlauf(2005); and this volume of Judd and 
Tesfatsion (2005). For other commentarieson this approach see: Lane (1993); the introduction to Arthur et 
al. (1997); Colander (2000); and Tesfatsion (2005). 
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2 Beyond Equilibrium 
Economic agents—banks, consumers, firms, investors—continually adjust their market 
moves, buying decisions, prices, and forecasts to the situation these moves or decisions 
or prices or forecasts together create. To put this another way, individual behaviors 
collectively create an aggregate outcome; and they react to this outcome. There is 
nothing new in saying this. Economists have seen the economy this way at least since 
Adam Smith. Behavior creates pattern; and pattern in turn influences behavior. 
 
It might be natural in such a setting for economic theorists to study the unfolding of 
patterns that economic agents create. But this obviously is complicated. And therefore 
to seek analytical solutions, historically economics chose to simplify its questions. It 
asked instead what behavior caused an outcome or pattern that leads to no incentive to 
change that behavior. In other words, it asked what patterns in the economy would look 
like if they were at equilibrium—were consistent with the micro-behavior (actions, 
strategies, expectations) that creates them. Thus, for example, general equilibrium 
theory asks: What prices and quantities of goods produced and consumed are consistent 
with—would pose no incentives for change to—the overall pattern of prices and 
quantities in the economy’s markets? Game theory asks: What strategies, moves, or 
allocations are consistent with—would be the best course of action for an agent (under 
some criterion)—given the strategies, moves, allocations his rivals might choose? 
Rational expectations economics asks: What forecasts (or expectations) are consistent 
with—are on average validated by—the outcomes these forecasts and expectations 
together create? Partial-equilibrium economics—say in international trade theory—
asks: what local behaviors would produce larger patterns that would support (be 
consistent with) those local behaviors. 
 
This equilibrium approach lends itself to expression in equation form. And because an 
equilibrium by definition is a pattern that doesn’t change, in equation form it can 
studied for its structure, its implications, and the conditions under which it obtains. Of 
course the simplicity that makes such analytical examination possible has a price. To 
ensure tractability we usually have to assume homogeneous (or identical) agents, or at 
most two or three classes of agents. We have to assume that human behavior—a 
notoriously complicated affair—can be captured by simple mathematical functions. We 
have to assume agent behavior that is intelligent but has no incentive to change; hence 
we must assume that agents and their peers deduce their way into exhausting all 
information they might find useful, so they have no incentive to change. Still, as a 
strategy of advancement of analysis, this equilibrium approach has been enormously 
successful. As it evolved into the neoclassical structure we know today, it has built a 
degree of understanding that is the envy of other social sciences. 
 
I believe that economics is currently pushing beyond this equilibrium paradigm. It is 
natural to ask how agents’ behavior might not just be consistent with the aggregate 
pattern it creates, but how actions, strategies, or expectations might in general react to 
—might endogenously change with—the patterns they create. In other words, it is 
natural to ask how the economy behaves when it is not at a steady state—when it is out 
of equilibrium. At this more general level, we can surmise that economic patterns might 
settle down over sufficient time to a simple, homogeneous equilibrium. Or, that they 
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might not: they might show everchanging, perpetually novel behavior. We might also 
surmise they might show new phenomena that do not appear in steady state. 
 
By its very nature this approach calls for detailed instructions on how individual 
behavior adjusts as the situation unfolds; therefore it is algorithmic. And since there is 
considerable scope for learning or reacting in different ways, this approach sees no 
reason to treat adjustments in behavior as identical. Agents must therefore be separately 
considered; hence the approach is based on individual agents. Consideration of 
economic patterns out of equilibrium therefore naturally introduces algorithmic 
updating and heterogeneity of agents. On both these counts it is best handled by 
computation. 
 
One possible objection to doing economics this way is that because the approach is 
computational, it does not constitute theory. But this statement is too facile. If working 
out the implications of a set of assumptions is theory, then whether this is done by hand 
or by computer does not matter. Both methods yield theory. But certainly there is a 
difference in style. Equation-based methods call for equation-based dissection of the 
results—and equation-based discovery of telling implications—and this dissection and 
analysis can be accomplished rigorously. Of course often the rigor is specious. 
Implications match reality only as well as the chosen assumptions and chosen functional 
forms do; and functional forms are always abstractions of  reality—often gross ones 
when closely examined—so there is plenty of scope for rigorous deduction based  upon 
faulty assumptions. Computer-based modeling is different but parallel in these regards. 
It calls for statistical dissection of the phenomena discovered, and in many computer-
based models it may be difficult to discern phenomena through the thicket of events. 
There is also scope for unrealistic assumptions and for needless complication. And 
doing computer-based economics well is not necessarily easier than doing analytical 
economics well. Good work here shows an eye for elegance of experiment for the 
telling, simple, computational model that demonstrates a phenomenon clearly; and for 
extracting a phenomenon from the jumble of other data that obscure it. 
 
The two styles can of course be mixed. If a phenomenon shows up computationally, 
often it can be reproduced in a simpler analytical model. If it shows up analytically, it 
can be probed computationally. Properly carried out, computation does not replace 
theory. It allows more realistic assumptions and accommodates out-of-equilibrium 
behavior. It thereby extends theory. It is also good to remember—and I want to 
emphasize this—that exploring the economy out of equilibrium does not require 
computation. That could be done in principle by analytical methods, as it has in some 
particular cases, especially those involving learning mechanisms (Samuelson 1997; 
Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Brock and Hommes, 1998.) But for most agent-based 
situations analytical formulations are highly complicated, hence the resort to 
computation.  
 
A different objection is that because out-of-equilibrium studies require detailed 
modeling of how individual behavior adjusts (and how agents interact), they encourage 
behavioral assumptions that are ad hoc. The point has some merit: assumptions are 
sometimes adopted for convenience. But we need to remember that the standard 
assumptions of “rational behavior” themselves are highly stylized versions of reality. If 
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modeling agent adjustments forces us to study and think rigorously about actual human 
behavior, this is actually  a strength.   
 
Out-of-equilibrium studies of course do not answer all possible questions. They do not 
tell us usually about the formation of tastes, or of technologies, or of structure. David 
Lane (1993) notes that such studies “offer only very limited scope to the emergence of 
new structures—and, so far, none at all to the emergence of higher-level entities.” What 
emerges is pattern, not hierarchical structure. 
 
One thing noticeable about agent-based studies is that they are nearly always 
evolutionary in approach.  Why should this be? I said earlier that an assumption 
common to most studies is that agents differ in the way they react to aggregate patterns; 
they have different circumstances, different histories, different psychologies. That is, 
agents are adaptive and heterogeneous. On first thought, this might seem to yield at 
most a trivial extension to standard homogeneous theory. But consider. If heterogeneous 
agents (or heterogeneous strategies or expectations) adjust continually to the overall 
situation they together create, then they adapt within an “ecology” they together create. 
And in so adapting, they change that ecology. So providing we use “evolution” in the 
broadest sense of the word, which I interpret as elements adapting their state to the 
situation they together create, we see that in this sense evolution emerges naturally from 
the very construction  of such modeling. It need not be added as an adjunct. (Of course 
in any particular case we would need to define precisely what we mean by “elements,” 
“adapting,” “states,” and “situation.”) Because out-of-equilibrium economics is by its 
nature evolutionary, it resembles modern evolutionary biology more than it does 19th 
century physics. 
 
Agent-based, non-steady-state economics is also a generalization of equilibrium 
economics. Out-of-equilibrium systems may converge to or display patterns that are 
consistent—that call for no further adjustments.  If so, standard equilibrium behavior 
becomes a special case. It follows that out-of-equilibrium economics is not in 
competition with equilibrium theory. It is merely economics done in a more general, 
generative way. 
 
I have made a large claim so far, namely that a new form of economics is a-birthing—a 
generative or out-of-equilibrium economics. If the reader accepts this, a natural question 
to ask is what it delivers. What novel phenomena do we see when we do economics out 
of equilibrium? Are there questions that equilibrium economics can not answer, but that 
this more general form of economics can? In Kuhnian language, are there anomalies 
that this new paradigm resolves? 
 
The answer to this last question is yes. In the remainder of this essay I want to look at 
two characteristic anomalies—two indeterminacies, to be precise—in equilibrium 
economics and show that these disappear under the new approach. Along the way, I 
want to point to some characteristic phenomena that arise in the new approach. I will 
base the discussion mainly on a study by Lindgren and on three topics I have been 
heavily involved with, because these address directly the points I want to make (and 
because I am most familiar with them). There are certainly other studies that widen the 
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scope of agent-based economics beyond the discussion here.2 These also, I believe, 
corroborate the arguments I will make here. 
3 Perpetual Novelty 
Let me begin with a phenomenon, one often we see in this sort of economics. That is the 
absence of any equilibrium, or more positively, the presence of ever-changing, 
perpetually novel behavior. For an example, consider the classic study of Kristian 
Lindgren (1991). Lindgren sets up a computerized tournament where strategies compete 
in randomly chosen pairs to play a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. The elements in 
his study are therefore strategies rather than human agents. Strategies that do well 
replicate and mutate. Ones that lose eventually die. Strategies can “deepen” by using 
deeper memory of their past moves and their opponent’s. A strategy’s success of course 
depends on the current population of strategies, and so the adaptive elements here—
strategies—react to, or change with, the competitive world they together create. 
 
In his computerized tournament Lindgren discovered that the simple strategies in use at 
the start went unchallenged for some time. Tit-for-tat and other simple strategies 
dominated at the beginning. But then other, deeper strategies emerged that were able to 
exploit the mixture of these simple ones. In time, yet deeper strategies emerged to take 
advantage of those, and so on. If strategies got “too smart”—that is, too complicated—
sometimes simple ones could exploit these. In this computer world of strategies, 
Lindgren found periods with very large numbers of diverse strategies in the population, 
and periods with few strategies.  And he found periods dominated by simple strategies, 
and periods dominated by deep strategies. But nothing ever settled down. In Lindgren’s 
world the set of strategies in use evolved and kept evolving in a world of perpetual 
novelty. This is unfamiliar to us in standard economics. Yet there is a realism about 
such dynamics with its unpredictable, emergent, and complicated sets of strategies. 
Chess play at the grand master level evolves over decades and never settles down. 
Lindgren’s system is simple, yet it leads to a dynamic of endless unfolding and 
evolution. 
 
When, in general, do we see perpetually novel behavior in the economy? There is no 
precise rule, but broadly speaking perpetual novelty arises in two circumstances. One is 
where there is frustration (to use a physics term) in the system. Roughly this means that 
it is not possible to satisfy the needs of all the agents (or elements) at the same time and 
that these jostle continually to have their needs fulfilled. The other is where exploration 
is allowed and learning can deepen indefinitely—can see better and better into the 
system it is trying to understand. In this case collective behaviors can explore into 
constantly new realms, sometimes mutually complicate, sometimes simplify, but not 
settle down. 
                                                 
2
 For some early studies see: Bak et al. (1993); Durlauf (1993); Lindgren (1991); Marimon et al. (1990); 
Sargent (1994); and Schelling (1978). See also Young (1998). The earliest agent-based studies I know of 
were by Miller (1988), and Marks (1989). From the most recently available collection (Arthur et al. 
1997), the reader might consult the papers of Blume, Durlauf, Kirman, Kollman et al., Ioannides, Lane 
and Maxfield, and Tesfatsion. The forthcoming collection of Blume and Durlauf (2005) and this volume 
contain more recent work. For the literature on network interactions, see Wilhite (2005, this volume). 
 6
4 Equilibrium Indeterminacy and the Selection Process 
In the Lindgren case, the situation shows no equilibrium; it is always in perpetual 
novelty. In other cases equilibrium is possible, but there may be more than one natural 
pattern of consistency: there may be multiple equilibria. This situation arises naturally 
in the presence of positive feedbacks or increasing returns—or more technically, under 
non-convexity. Here multiple equilibria are the norm. At first sight this does not seem to 
pose any major difficulty to equilibrium economics. Instead of a unique equilibrium 
there are several. But there is a difficulty. Equilibrium economics can identify consistent 
patterns, but can not tell us how one comes to be chosen. Standard economics therefore 
runs up against an indeterminacy. 
 
This indeterminacy has been an embarrassment to economics over the years. "Multiple 
equilibria," wrote  Schumpeter in his 1954 book, "are not necessarily useless, but from 
the standpoint of any exact science the  existence of a uniquely determined equilibrium 
is, of course, of the utmost importance, even if proof has to  be purchased at the price of 
very restrictive assumptions; without any possibility of proving the existence of  
uniquely determined equilibria—or at all events, of a small number of possible 
equilibria—at however high a level of abstraction, a field of phenomena is really a 
chaos that is not under analytical control." Faced with this potential “chaos,” different 
subfields of economics took different approaches. Some—especially within game 
theory in the 1960s and ‘70s—added restrictive (and somewhat artificial) assumptions 
until only a single solution remained. Others, contrary to Schumpeter, accepted the 
chaos. They statically determined the possible equilibria in a problem and left the choice 
of equilibrium open and therefore indeterminate.  An example is the international trade 
theory of Helpman and Krugman (1985) which allowed increasing returns and settled 
for multiple static, but indeterminate, equilibria. 
 
A more natural approach, I believe, is to tackle the issue generatively (Arthur 1989, 
1994): to see the problem not as one of equilibrium selection but as one of equilibrium 
formation. Economic activity is quantized  by events that are too small to foresee, and 
these small "random" events—who sits next to whom on an  airplane, who tenders an 
offer when, who adopts what product when—can over time cumulate and become  
magnified by positive feedbacks to determine which solution was reached. This 
suggests that situations with multiple equilibria can best be modeled by looking at what 
happens over time—what happens in formation.  That is, they are best modeled not as 
static deterministic problems, but as dynamic processes with random events, with 
natural positive feedbacks or nonlinearities. With this strategy the situation can then be  
“observed” theoretically as its corresponding process unfolds again and again to 
“select” or determine an  outcome. Sometimes one equilibrium will emerge, sometimes 
(under identical conditions) another. It is impossible to know in advance which of the 
candidate outcomes will emerge in any given unfolding of the process, but it is possible 
to study the probability that a particular solution emerges under a certain set of initial 
conditions. In this way the selection problem can be handled by modeling the situation 
in formation, by translating it into a dynamic process with random events. With an out-
of-equilibrium approach, the anomaly disappears. 
 
In this sense a whole realm of economics—increasing returns problems—requires an 
out-of-equilibrium approach. This realm, by the way, is not small. Increasing returns 
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arise in economic geography, finance, economics of markets, economic development, 
economics of technology, and economics of poverty; and the literature in these areas is 
becoming large. Interestingly, in most of the important cases the work has been 
analytical, not computational. The reason is that most increasing returns problems lend 
themselves to sufficient homogeneity of agents to be handled by analysis. 
 
Whatever their topic of focus, increasing returns studies tend to show common 
properties: a multiplicity of potential “solutions”; the outcome actually reached is not 
predictable in advance; it is “selected” by small events; it tends to be locked in; it is not 
necessarily the most efficient; it is subject to the historical path  taken; and while the 
problem may be symmetrical, the outcome is usually asymmetrical. These properties 
have counterparts in a different science that emphasizes the formation of pattern: solid-
state physics. What economists call multiple equilibria, non-predictability, lock-in, 
inefficiency, historical path dependence, and asymmetry, physicists call multiple meta-
stable states, unpredictability, phase- or mode-locking, highenergy  ground states, non-
ergodicity, and symmetry breaking. Some of these properties can be identified by static 
analysis (multiplicity, possible non-efficiency, non-predictability, and lock-in). But to 
see how they come about, and to see symmetry breaking, selection, and path-
dependence in action, requires looking at  the situation as the solution forms—out of 
equilibrium. 
5 Expectational Indeterminacy and Inductive Behavior 
Multiple equilibria cause one type of indeterminacy in static economics. Expectations 
can cause another, and this also requires out-of-equilibrium resolution. Let me explain. 
 
All economic actions are taken on the expectation of some outcome. And in many 
situations this outcome is determined collectively—it depends upon the results of other 
people’s actions. Thus an entrepreneur may have to decide on whether to invest in a 
new semiconductor fabrication plant today, based upon what he  forecasts supply in the 
market to be like in two years’ time. And his competitors may have to make similar 
decisions. But the collective result of their choices today will determine the aggregate 
supply (and hence  prices and profits) in two years’ time. 
 
In cases like this, agents attempt to forecast what the outcome will be; but their actions 
based on their forecasts determine this outcome. So the situation is self-referential: 
agents are trying to form expectations about an outcome that is a function of their 
expectations. Or, to collapse this further, their choices of expectation depend on their 
choices of expectation. Without some additional conditions imposed, there is no logical 
or deductive way to settle this self-referential choice. This is a fundamental 
indeterminacy in static economics. 
 
It is tempting to dismiss this as a minor anomaly, but the situation that causes it 
pervades economics: it occurs anywhere agents’ decisions affect other agents.3 It 
confronts economics with a lacuna—how expectations might logically be formed in 
                                                 
3
 For some history and commentary on this indeterminacy see Koppl and Rosser (2002).  
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multi-agent situations. And it is the main reason economists feel uneasy about problems 
with expectations. 
 
Static economic theory, of course, does deal with problems where multi-agent 
expectations must be considered; it has evolved a theoretical method—a sort of 
analytical workaround—to do this: the rational expectations approach. Rational 
expectations ask, within a given economic problem, what expectational model (if 
everyone adopted it) would lead to actions that would on average validate that 
expectational model. If such a model existed, agents’ expectations would be on average 
upheld, and this would solve the problem of selecting suitable expectations. 
 
Actually, this last assertion came too fast. To be rigorously exact, if such a model 
existed it would demonstrate at least one set of expectations consistent with the 
outcome. Whether this translates into a theory of expectations formation matched by 
reality is another question, one that leaves even supporters of this approach 
uncomfortable. To suppose that this solution to a given problem would be reached in a 
one-off non-repeated problem, we would need to assume that agents can somehow 
deduce in advance what model will work, that everyone “knows” this model will be 
used, and everyone knows that everyone knows this model will be used, ad infinitum. 
(This is the common knowledge assumption.) And we would further require a unique 
solution; otherwise agents might coordinate on different expectations. 
 
The net effect is that unless there is good reason for agents to coordinate somehow on a 
single set of expectations, rational expectations become theoretically singular: they 
resemble a pencil balanced on its point—logically possible but in reality unlikely. The 
situation worsens when agents differ. They must now form expectations of an outcome 
that is a function of expectations they are not privy to. Whether behaviorally or 
theoretically, barring some obvious coordinating set of expectations, the indeterminacy 
can not be  avoided. Deductive equilibrium economics therefore faces an anomaly. 
 
As a theory of expectations formation, rational expectations begin to look better if the 
situation is repeated over time, because we might suppose that agents “learn” their way 
over time into on-average correct expectations.  In this case rational expectations would 
at least form a solution to which expectations converge.  But it is possible to construct 
repeated situations in economics where rational expectations are not a guide—where in 
fact they must fail. Consider the El Farol bar problem (Arthur 1994). One hundred 
people must decide independently each week whether to show up at their favorite bar 
(El Farol in Santa Fe, say).  The rule is that if a person predicts that more that 60 (say) 
will attend, she will avoid the crowds and stay home; if she predicts fewer than 60 she 
will go. We see at once the self reference I mentioned above: agents attend based on 
their predictions of how many agents will attend. 
 
Will rational expectations work here? Suppose for a moment they do. Suppose that a 
rational expectations prediction machine exists and all agents possess a copy of it. Such 
a machine would take a given history of attendance (say, ten weeks back) and map it 
into a forecast of the coming week’s attendance, and by definition it would on average 
predict correctly. Suppose now this machine predicts one week that 74 will attend.  But, 
knowing this nobody shows up, negating that forecast. Suppose the next week it 
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predicts 44.  Then 100 people go, negating that forecast as well. In El Farol, 
expectations that are shared in common negate themselves. Therefore forecasts that are 
on average consistent with the outcome they predict do not exist and can not be 
statically deduced. As a theory of expectations formation, rational expectation fails here. 
The indeterminacy is also manifest in this case. Any attempt to deduce a reasonable 
theory of expectations that applies to all is quickly confounded.4 
 
The anomaly resolves itself in this case (and in general) if we take a generative 
approach and observe expectations in formation. To do this we can assume agents start 
each with a variety of expectational models or forecasting hypotheses, none of them 
necessarily “correct.” We can assume these expectations are subjectively arrived at and 
therefore differ. We can also assume agents act as statisticians: they test their 
forecasting models, retain the ones that work, and discard the others. This is inductive 
behavior. It assumes no a-priori “solution” but sets out merely to learn what works. 
Such an approach applies out of equilibrium (expectations need not be consistent with 
their outcome) as well as in equilibrium; and it applies generally to multi-agent 
problems where expectations are involved. (See Holland et al. (1986), and Sargent 
(1994).) 
 
Putting this into practice in the case of El Farol means assuming that agents individually 
form a number of predictive hypotheses or models, and each week act on their currently 
most accurate one. (Call this their active predictor.) In this way beliefs or hypotheses 
compete for use in an ecology these beliefs create. Computer simulation then shows that 
the mean attendance quickly converges to 60. In fact, the predictors self-organize into 
an equilibrium pattern or “ecology” in which, on average, 40% of the active predictors 
are forecasting above 60 and 60% below 60. And while the population of active 
predictors splits into this 60/40 average ratio, it keeps changing in membership forever. 
There is a strong equilibrium here, but it emerges ecologically and is not the outcome of 
deductive reasoning.   
 
My point in this discussion is not just that it is possible to construct problems that 
confound rational expectations. It is this: In multi-agent situations the formation of 
expectations introduces a fundamental indeterminacy into equilibrium economics; but if 
we allow expectations to form out of equilibrium in an inductive, agent-based way, the 
indeterminacy disappears. Expectation formation then becomes a natural process.   
 
If we apply this generative approach to standard problems, do expectations indeed 
usually converge to the rational expectations norm? The answer is mixed: sometimes 
they do and sometimes they don’t, depending on whether there is a strong attractor to 
the rational expectations norm or not. Interestingly both answers can obtain in the same 
problem. Different parameter sets can show different behaviors. In one set (or phase or 
regime) simple equilibrium behavior might reign; in another complex, non-converging 
                                                 
4
 This El Farol situation of preferring to be in the minority occurs in the economy anywhere pre-
committed decisions have to be made under diminishing returns (to the numbers committing). In its 
minority game formulation, the problem is much studied among physicists (see Challet, Marsalis and 
Zhang, 2004; and Coolen, 2005). 
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pattern-forming behavior might obtain. My guess is that such phases will turn out to be 
common in agent-based models. 
 
Consider as an example the Santa Fe artificial stock market (Palmer et al., 1994; Arthur 
et al. 1997). The model is essentially a heterogeneous-agent version of the classic Lucas 
equilibrium model (1978). In it heterogeneous agents, or artificial investors, form a 
market within the computer where a single stock is traded.  Each monitors the stock 
price and submits bids and offers which jointly determine tomorrow’s price.  Agents 
form (differing) multiple hypotheses of what moves the market price, act on the most 
accurate, and  learn by creating new hypotheses and discarding poorly performing one. 
We found two regimes: if agents update their hypotheses at a slow rate, the diversity of 
expectations collapses into a homogeneous rational expectations regime. The reason is 
simple: if a majority of investors believes something close to the rational expectations 
forecast it becomes a strong attractor; others lose by deviating from these expectations 
and slowly learn their way to them. But if the rate of updating of hypotheses is tuned 
higher, the market undergoes a phase transition into a “complex regime.” Here it 
displays several properties seen in real markets.  It develops a rich “psychology” of 
divergent beliefs that do not converge over time. Expectational rules such as “If the 
market is trending up, predict a 2% price rise” appear randomly in the population of 
hypotheses and become temporarily mutually reinforcing. (If enough investors act on 
these, the price will indeed go up.) In this way sub-populations of mutually reinforcing 
expectations arise, and fall away again.  This is not quite perpetual novelty. But it is a 
phenomenon common to such studies: patterns that are self-reinforcing arise, lock-in for 
some time (much as clouds do in meteorology), and disappear. 
 
We also see another phenomenon, again common to out-of-equilibrium studies: 
avalanches of change of varying sizes. These arise because individual out-of-
equilibrium behavior adjusts from time to time, which changes the aggregate, which in 
turn may call for further behavioral changes among agents. As a result in such systems 
cascades of change—some small and some large—can ripple through the system. In 
artificial markets this phenomenon shows up as agents changing their expectations 
(perhaps by exploring new ones) which changes the market slightly, and which may 
cause other agents to also change their expectations. Changes in beliefs then ripple 
through the market in avalanches of all sizes, causing random periods of high and low 
price volatility. This phenomenon shows up in actual financial market data but not in 
equilibrium models. One interesting question is whether such avalanches show 
properties associated with phase boundaries in physics, namely power laws where the 
size of the avalanche is inversely proportional to its frequency. Systems that display this 
behavior may be technically critical: they may lie precisely between ordered and 
chaotic behavior. We might conjecture that in certain economic situations behavior 
ensures that the outcome remains poised in this region—technically that self-organized 
criticality (Bak et al., 1988) arises. 
6 Conclusion 
After two centuries of studying equilibria—patterns of consistency that call for no 
further behavioral adjustments—economists are beginning to study the emergence of 
equilibria and the general unfolding of patterns in the economy. That is, we are starting 
to study the economy out of equilibrium. This way of doing economics calls for an 
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algorithmic approach. And it invites a deeper approach to agents’ reactions to change, 
and a recognition that these may differ—and therefore that agents are naturally 
heterogeneous. This form of economics is naturally evolutionary. It is not in 
competition with equilibrium theory, nor is it a minor adjunct to the standard economic 
theory. It is economics done in a more general, out-of-equilibrium way. Within this, 
standard equilibrium behavior becomes a special case. 
 
When viewed out of equilibrium, the economy reveals itself not as deterministic, 
predictable and mechanistic; but as process-dependent, organic and evolving. Economic 
patterns sometimes simplify into a simple, homogeneous equilibrium of standard 
economics. But often they do not. Often they are ever-changing, showing perpetually 
novel behavior. 
 
One test of a different fundamental approach is whether it can handle certain 
difficulties—anomalies—that have stymied the old one. Certainly this is the case with 
out-of-equilibrium economics. Within the static approach, both the problem of 
equilibrium selection and of choice of expectations are in general indeterminate.  These 
two indeterminacies should not be surprising, because both problems are in essence 
ones of formation—of coming into being—that can not be resolved by static analysis. 
Both have been the source of considerable discomfort in economics. But when analyzed 
out of equilibrium they fall into their proper setting, and the difficulties they cause 
dissolve and disappear. 
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